WEST PALM BEACH, FLORIDA—On July 15, U.S. District Judge Aileen Cannon granted former President Donald J. Trump’s motion to dismiss the indictment appointment and funding of Special Counsel Jack Smith based on the violation of the appointment clause.

According to documentation on the Department of Justice webpage, in November 2022, the U.S. Attorney General, Merrick Garland appointed U.S. Attorney, Jack Smith to oversee the criminal investigations of classified documents case against the former sitting President, Donald J. Trump.

According to the procedural history and overview of the motion, Trump was criminally indicted last June.

“On June 8, 2023, a grand jury in the Southern District of Florida returned an indictment, signed by the Special Counsel, charging former President Trump with thirty-one counts of willful retention of national defense information in his Mar-a-Lago residence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.”

In addition, “on July 27, 2023, the grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment, also signed by the Special Counsel, increasing the number of total charges to forty-two, and adding a third defendant, Carlos De Oliveira [ECF No. 85].”

On February 22, former President Trump filed a motion to dismiss this case as AG Merrick Garland, had no authority to appoint Jack Smith in the first place.

Special Counsel Jack Smith filed an opposition on March 7. The following statement can be found on page 5 of Judge Cannon’s order:

“Finally, on June 21 and 24, 2024, the Court heard lengthy oral arguments on the Motion from the parties and the authorized amici. The Motion seeks dismissal of the Superseding Indictment ‘based on the unlawful appointment and funding of Special Counsel Jack Smith’.”

In the motion, Judge Cannon cited her reasons for dismissing this case:

“The first is a challenge to his appointment under the Appointments Clause, which provides the exclusive means for appointing “Officers of the United States.” Article II, § 2, cl. 2. The Appointments Clause sets as a default rule that all “Officers of the United States”—whether “inferior” or “principal”—must be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Id. It then goes on to direct that “Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or Heads of Departments.”

“…and (2) there is no “other Law” authorizing the appropriation as to him [ECF No. 326]. The Special Counsel opposes both challenges. As to the Appointments Clause issue, he urges that the Attorney General exercised statutory authority in 28 U.S.C. §§ 515 and 533 to appoint him, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), D.C. Circuit authority, and historical practice [ECF No. 374 pp. 1–16].

As to the Appropriations Clause issue, Special Counsel Smith argues that he lawfully draws from the Indefinite Appropriation for independent counsels, because he retains substantial independence from the Attorney General and was appointed, pursuant, to, ‘other law’ in the form of the same statutes cited above—28 U.S.C. §§ 515 and 533. In any case, Special Counsel Smith continues, any appropriations defect should not result in dismissal of the Superseding Indictment because the Department could lawfully have drawn funds from another source to investigate and prosecute this action [ECF No. 374 p. 25].”

The full text of the motion may be found here.gov.uscourts.flsd.648652.672.0_2